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THE NEXT MILLENIUM ROUND OF WORLD TRADE 







The next Round of multilateral negotiations is due to commence in 1999. Countries have 
already learned a lot from the shortcomings of the previous agricultural negotiations in the 
implementation of the agriculture negotiations and in the Analysis and Information Exchange 
meetings since 1997. The ministerial meeting of developed countries (OECD), has revealed that 
their future development of agricultural policy has changed little as a result of policy changes 
in the 1990s. In the next Round the EU is expected to be mainly on the defensive to try and 
maintain subsidy provisions. The main players that are expected to fuel the upcoming 
negotiations are the Cairns Group of agricultural export countries as well as the United States. 
The main task of reformers would be related to substantial further reduction of distortive trade 
measures, the covering of matters left unresolved in the Uruguay Round and to close the 
loopholes of the previous agreement. In general, reformers would like to push for a fairer system 




The Uruguay Agreement on Agriculture was implemented in 1995. The 
Agreement (article 20) has a build in agenda to continue with reforms and 
reads as follows: recognising that the long-term objective of substantial 
progressive reductions in support and protection resulting in fundamental 
reform is an ongoing process, Members agree that negotiations for continuing 
the process will be initiated one year before the end of the implementation 
period (WTO, 1994).  An informal process of Analysis and Information 
Exchange (AIE) commenced in 1997, prior to the next negotiations. This is a 
process where countries can obtain a better understanding of the effect of the 
implementation of the previous round on agriculture in order to be in a better 
position to participate in the next round of multilateral negotiations. The 
World Trade Organization (WTO) ministers met in Geneva on 20 May and 
agreed to begin preparations for the next round of multilateral negotiations to 
commence next year (1999). To this end, the General Council will meet in 
Special Session in September 1998.  
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…the preparatory process and mandate 
 
South Africa as well as the Cairns position regarding the preparatory process 
is that;  
 
1)  it should be managed at the level of the General Council and not by the 
Committee of Agriculture (the latter is mainly responsible for monitoring 
the agreements); 
 
2)  that an informal process for heads of delegation should be initiated in 
September 98 to meet regularly to carry out the details; 
 
3)  and that the Analysis and Information process should not be used to delay 
the negotiations. 
 
South Africa is of the opinion that the role of the Cairns Group is to inject a 
high level of initiative and dynamics into the preparations to the negotiations 
to keep the process moving forward. For the negotiations to start in full and to 
prevent any delays, a broad mandate has to be formulated from September 
1998 to December 1998. A detailed as possible negotiating plan for agriculture 
(road map) has to be ready by the middle of next year to be approved by the 
III Ministerial Conference at the end of next year. Agriculture industries and 
agri-businesses are therefor invited to make proposals on aspects the mandate 
should cover. Inputs are through the Agricultural Trade Forum represented 
by industries and agri-business.  
 
…agriculture negotiations only…or full round 
 
The question of a big “Millenium Round” within the WTO is still to be 
resolved. The full negotiating package is still to be determined. However, it 
will be less likely to make significant progress in agricultural trade 
liberalization in a stand-alone sectoral negotiation (Brookins). In remarks 
commemorating the WTO’s 50th university, President Clinton expressed 
frustration over the length of time required to conduct multilateral 
negotiations in all sectors and suggested a sectoral approach of moving 
forward on areas where agreement could be reached( Brick-Turin, Blumenthal 
& Brookins, 1998).  However, the latter approach to market access usually 
pushed by the US, tend to leave liberalisation in tough sectors like agriculture 
behind. Nevertheless, the principal of comparative advantage cuts across 
sectors and experience shows that a broader round will produce better results 






Major players in the new round, as in the GATT UR, which was completed in 
1994, are likely to be the US, the EU, Japan and the Cairns Group of major 
agriculture exporting countries. South Africa was recently accepted as a Cairns 
Group member. Neither the EU nor Japan has much interest in rapid progress. 
Pressure to commence early with negotiations and drive to make substantial 
commitments in the negotiations can be expected from mainly the Cairns group 
as well as from the United States. Cairns are of the opinion that completing the 
task of liberalizing agricultural trade will bring important benefits in terms of 
economic growth, improved welfare, food security and sustainable 
development (NDA, 1998). 
 
…domestic support… levels still excessive… 
 
Agriculture ministers of developed OECD countries demonstrated in their 
Ministerial meeting in March 1998 that their positions on the future 
development of agricultural policy has changed little as a result of the policy 
and other changes of the 1990’s. According to the OECD Secretariat, the 
proportion of farm incomes coming from subsidy or market manipulation 
remains high. Support to agricultural producers, as measured by the Producers 
Subsidy Equivalent, has fallen from an OECD-wide average of 45% of the value 
of production in 1986-88 to an estimated 35% in 1997 (OECD, 1997). Total 
transfers from consumers and taxpayers due to agricultural policies decreased 
from a share of 2.2% of GDP to 1.3%, reaching a level of US$ 280 billion in 1997. 
Much of the reductions in the early 1990’s have been due largely to the high 
level of world prices, which has reduced the need for market intervention 
(Brussels, 1998).  
 
Nevertheless, many other WTO members have made substantial and 
fundamental policy changes as a result of the UR. The reformers still want more 
reform and the conservatives want to conserve as much as they can of their 
protectionist policies. OECD figures also shows that those countries with the 
highest support levels in the base period (e.g. Switzerland, Norway, Japan and 
the EU) made little reductions on domestic support, while countries which had 
relatively much less support (e.g. Canada, US, Mexico and New Zealand) made 
large percentage reductions to their domestic support.  




… the Uruguay Round made a start … but the next round has to be better 
 
As discussed, the Uruguay Round achieved little in reducing the domestic 
support of markets by some countries, which is at the root of the distortion of 
international agricultural markets. The main reasons for the ineffectiveness of 
the measures agreed in the UR was that the data on which they were based 
allowed little scope for significant reductions in protection and subsidization. 
With most commodities the base period selected from which reductions were 
to be made (1986 – 1990) were far too preferential to high protectors and 
subsidizers, because of low world prices and levels of support and 
subsidization were at their peak at the time (Brussels, 1997). Reductions in 
domestic support were aggregated and allowed scope for increases in support 
to selective commodities. Inequalities in reduction commitments also exist due 
to the calculation methodology on market price support, such that it favours 
developed countries with relatively low inflation rates.  
 
Measurements of support by OECD have shown that since the base period 
there was little reform on the products with the highest support (rice, milk, 
sugar and beef and veal) in OECD countries. Large reductions were made on 
the reduction of domestic support on products that had relatively little 
support in the past (grains, wheat and maize). Some countries (the US, 
Canada and Cairns members) suggested that it might be necessary to have 
reduction commitments on a commodity basis. The most likely application of 
a sectoral approach of agricultural industries is to have faster liberalisation of 
less sensitive products. However, placing roofs on highly protective sectors to 
ensure progressive reductions in support might be necessary to make any 
progress over the long term. 
 
The EU will be careful not to show its hand in the forthcoming negotiations – 
principally because it is likely to be mainly on the defensive (Brussels, 1998). 
One of the main objectives of the EU will be the preservation of the right to 
maintain producer subsidies (compensation payments) either in the current 
“blue box” category or as environmental / social adjustment measures. In the 
EU these payments are still coupled to production or factors of production. 
The Cairns Group on the other hand would like to see reduction commitments 
on this distortive measure. Even the United States have decoupled their 
deficiency payments in order to move in the direction of less trade distorting 
measures.   
 
A start was made in the Uruguay Round to reform agriculture by putting a 




foundations set by the UR. But it is clear that work still has to be done on the 
Agreement on Agriculture on problem areas that still exists (WTO 
Secretariat). There is also a widening of the gap in support levels and benefits 
of provisions between countries that tend to create an “unfair situation”.    
 
…non trade concerns will become more important… 
 
The European Union in particular is pushing the idea of the multifunctionality 
of agriculture to justify that direct subsidies to agriculture production are 
necessary to maintain the social role or other functions of agriculture (WTO 
Secretariat). In the light of these developments, Cairns countries will develop a 
proactive strategy regarding non-trade concerns. The main stream of thought 
might be to accentuate issues related to the detrimental effects of subsidies on 
the environment and food security (income security) and to ensure that any 
measures are decoupled from distortive trade effects.  
 
More attention will in future be focused on agriculture environmental 
payments. The green box will have to be truly green (Brussels, 1998). A great 
shift in support has taken place, especially in the EU, from former market price 
support to direct payments to farmers. Although less distortive than market 
price support, various direct payments still have distortive effects on 
production and trade. A payment to compensate for a certain externality might 
have an effect on other externalities of other countries, if the measures are not 
focused and if criteria are not properly decoupled from production. If initiated 
and accepted, some green box criteria will have to be reviewed. However, 
monitoring of the green box measures is just as important in assuring that 
policies notified as such are indeed green.   
 
Cairns believes food security will be enhanced through more diversified 
reliable sources of supply, as more farmers, including poorer farmers in 
developing countries, are able to respond to market forces and new income 
generating opportunities, without the burden of competition from heavily 
subsidized products. Export restrictions must not be allowed to disrupt the 
supply of food to world markets, in particular the net food importing countries 
(NDA, 1998).  
 
Cairns is further of the opinion that in many cases agricultural subsidies and 
access restrictions have stimulated farm practices that are harmful to the 
environment. Reform of these policies can contribute to the development of 
environmentally sustainable agriculture (NDA, 1998). The recovering of world 




sustainable, both from an economic point of view as well as in terms of 
sustaining natural resources. 
 
…export subsidies…no justification exists… 
 
During the Uruguay Round developed countries were able to negotiate the 
retention of high levels of export subsidies for agricultural products. The main 
formal obligation was that such subsidies should not be used to acquire more 
than an “equitable share” of world export trade in particular primary 
agricultural products. The rules as interpreted and applied become more of a 
license to use export subsidies than an effective discipline. This could be seen in 
a recent tit-for-tat retaliation of the US by reactivating its Export Enhancement 
Programme (EEP), to cheap subsidized imports of EU barley and in targeting 
third country markets where the EU is active. Hopefully in future negotiations 
there will be more serious constraints. While the EU would like the retention of 
the right to utilize export subsidies when necessary, developing countries for 
various reasons, including fiscal constraints, have already lost the ability to use 
export subsidies.  
 
The WTO Secretariat’s assessment of export subsidies in 1995 shows that only 
six developed countries (European Union, Switzerland, United States, New 
Zealand, Australia and Bulgaria) were legitimately in a position to subsidise 
77% (12 861 million US $) of the legitimate world-total exports subsidy levels. 
The EU alone could legitimately use 64% of this world-total. Given that export 
subsidies distort market prices and market flows, also for developing 
countries, this apparent and institutionalised imbalance is exacerbated when 
annual outlays, when fully utilised, are supplemented by the use of balances 
of subsidy not applied in previous years (Swart & Van Dijk, 1998). 
 
Cairns is of the opinion that no justification exists for maintaining export 
subsidies. It is essential that the 1999 negotiations ensure the early, total 
elimination and prohibition of all forms of these distortive and inequitable 
policies. There must be clear rules to prevent all forms of circumvention of 
export subsidy commitments. Also, agricultural export credits must be brought 
under effective international discipline w i t h  a  v i e w  t o  e n d i n g  g o v e r n m e n t  
subsidization of such credits (NDA, 1998). Individual developing farmers 










The principle of special and differential treatment for developing countries, 
including least developed countries and states, must also remain an integral 
part of the next WTO agriculture negotiations(WTO Secretariat) . If the 
multilateral system fails to benefit all members or at least the majority it will 
loose faith in the WTO as the major multilateral negotiating forum and 
countries will focus on other regional and bilateral agreements. The framework 
for liberalization must continue to support the economic development needs, 




The next round must provide a major expansion of market access opportunities 
for agricultural products, including value-added products and particular 
products of special interest to developing countries. This includes negotiations 
on tariffs as well as expanding the minimum market access commitments. 
Negotiations are expected to be on a broader base and can include other 
products than agriculture products.  
 
Some developed countries with special reference to the EU and Japan make 
substantial use of the “special safeguard” provision. It allows a country to 
protect a commodity in case of an alarming increase of imports without having 
to prove any injury. Some countries have in the Committee of Agriculture 
meeting been criticized for misusing this measure. Members might have to look 
more closely to the application of this measure and the possible misuse thereof.   
  
…state trading enterprises 
 
The US in particular would like to see greater transparency in the reporting of 
State Trading Enterprises (STE’s) and the necessary controls on the activities 
of state trading organizations. In fact they have in the past used it as an excuse 
to block the progress on putting disciplines on export credits. Several leading 
Cairns Group countries have critical interests in maintaining their STE’s. This 
includes Australia, Canada and New Zealand, which makes use of 
agricultural STE’s and argues that a too detailed reporting on STE activities 
would potentially reveal market-sensitive information and is only prepared to 
offer aggregate information (Brookins, 1997). It could also be argued that 
agricultural STE’s operate similarly to cartelization of industrial businesses in 
the US and that one should also be looking at the discussions of competition 






The reformers still want more reform and the conservatives want to conserve as 
much as they can of their protectionist policies. The EU is expected to be mainly 
on the defensive in the upcoming negotiations regarding agriculture. The main 
task of reformers would be related to substantial further reduction of distortive 
trade measures, the covering of matters left unresolved in the UR and to close 
the loopholes of the previous agreement. From a political point of view, 
reformers would like to push for a fairer system with more equal benefits to all. 
If the system fails to benefit the majority of countries or if it moves too slowly, 
countries will loose faith in the Multilateral System and turn more focus on 
regional agreements. If successful in negotiating a freer market, it can have 
substantial gains for developing countries like South Africa in terms of 
increased profitability on especially previously highly protected markets and 
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